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Abstract
Evidence for fine-tuning of physical parameters suitable for life can per-
haps be explained by almost any combination of providence, coincidence or
multiverse. A multiverse usually includes parts unobservable to us, but if the
theory for it includes suitable measures for observations, what is observable
can be explained in terms of the theory even if it contains such unobservable
elements. Thus good multiverse theories can be tested against observations.
For these tests and Bayesian comparisons of different theories that predict
more than one observation, it is useful to define the concept of “typicality”
as the likelihood given by a theory that a random result of an observation
would be at least as extreme as the result of one’s actual observation. Some
multiverse theories can be regarded as pertaining to a single universe (e.g. a
single quantum state obeying certain equations), raising the question of why
those equations apply. Other multiverse theories can be regarded as pertain-
ing to no single universe at all. These no longer raise the question of what the
equations are for a single universe but rather the question of why the measure
for the set of different universes is such as to make our observations not too
atypical.
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1 Multiverse explanations for fine-tuning
Many of the physical parameters of the observed part of our universe, whether
constants of nature or cosmological boundary conditions, seem fine-tuned for life
and us [1, 2, 3, 4]. There are three common explanations for this. One is that there
is a Fine-Tuner who providentially selected the physical parameters so that we can
be here. Another is that it is just a coincidence that the parameters turned out to
have the right values for us to be here. A third is that our observed universe is only
a small part of a much vaster universe or multiverse or megaverse or holocosm (my
own neologism for the whole), and that the physical parameters are not the same
everywhere but take values permitting us in our part.
These three explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example,
combining a Fine-Tuner with coincidence but without a multiverse, perhaps the uni-
verse was providentially created by a God who had a preference for a particularly
elegant single universe which only coincidentally gave values for the physical param-
eters that allowed us to exist. Or, for a Fine-Tuner with a multiverse but without
coincidences, perhaps God providentially created a multiverse for the purpose of
definitely creating us somewhere within it. Or, for coincidence and a multiverse
without a Fine-tuner, if the universe weren’t providentially created, it might be a
multiverse that has some parts suitable for us just coincidentally. Or, it might even
be that all three explanations are mutually true, say if God providentially created a
multiverse for reasons other than having us within it, and yet it was a coincidence
that this multiverse did contain us.
On the other hand, it seems conceivable (in the sense that I do not see any
obvious logical contradiction) that the universe is determined by some sort of blind
necessity that requires both our own existence and a single world with a single set
of physical parameters. In this case, the universe is not providential (in the sense of
being foreseen by any God) but nor is our existence coincidental.
Thus, logically, I don’t see that we can prove that any combination of the three
explanations is either correct or incorrect. However, it does seem a bit implausible
that none of these explanations is at least partially correct, and it also seems rather
implausible that the large number of fine-tunings that have been noticed are mere
coincidences.
I should perhaps at this point put my metaphysical cards on the table and say
that – as an evangelical Christian – I do believe the universe was providentially
created by God, and that – as quantum cosmologist with a sympathy toward the
Everett ‘many-worlds’ version of quantum theory – I also strongly suspect that the
universe is a multiverse, with different parts having different values of the physical
parameters. It seems plausible to me that – in a quantum theory with no arbitrary
collapses of the wavefunction – God might prefer an elegant physical theory (perhaps
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string/M theory with no adjustable dimensionless parameters) that would lead to
a multiverse that nevertheless has been created providentially by God with the
purpose of having life and us somewhere within it.
Although personally I have less confidence in string/M theory than in either
providence or the multiverse, nevertheless string/M theory is very attractive. It does
seem to be the best current candidate for a dynamical theory of the universe (i.e.
for its evolution, if not its state) and it does strongly appear to suggest a multiverse.
Since string/M theory has no adjustable dimensionless constants, if it predicted just
a single set of parameters, it would seem very surprising if these parameters came
out right for our existence. Thus if string/M theory – or some alternative with
no adjustable dimensionless constants – were correct, it would seem much more
plausible that it would lead to a multiverse, with different parts of the universe
having different physical parameters.
Indeed, string theorists [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] have argued that string/M theory
leads to an immense multiverse or landscape of different values of physical parame-
ters and ‘constants of nature’. It is not yet known whether the range of values can
include the physical parameters that allow life, such as those within our part of the
universe, but that does seem at least plausible with the enormous range suggested
in the string landscape or stringscape.
One objection that is often raised against the multiverse is that it is unobservable.
Of course, this depends on how the multiverse is defined. One definition would be
the existence of different parts, where some physical parameters are different, but
this just shifts the arbitrariness to the choice of this set of physical parameters.
Obviously if some quantity which varies with position (like energy density) were
included in the set of physical parameters, then even what we can see could be
considered a multiverse. But if we just include the so-called ‘constants of nature’,
like the fine structure constant and various other coupling constants and the mass
ratios of the various elementary particles, then what we can observe directly seems
to consist of a single universe. Indeed it would be rather natural – if ad hoc – to
define a multiverse with respect to the physical parameters that have no observable
variation within the part we can directly see. In this case, the multiverse becomes
unobservable, and it becomes an open question whether parts of the universe we
cannot see have different values of these constants. Many would argue that it is a
purely metaphysical concept that has no place in science.
However, in science we need not restrict our entities to be observable – we just
want the simplest theory, whether using observable or unobservable entities, to ex-
plain and predict what is observable. One cannot test scientifically a theory that
makes predictions about what is unobservable, but one can test a theory that makes
use of unobservable entities to explain and predict the observable ones. Therefore,
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if we find a multiverse theory that is simpler and more explanatory and predictive
of what is observed than the best single-universe theory, then the multiverse theory
should be preferred. The success of such a multiverse theory itself would then give
credence to the existence of the unobservable multiverse.
Another objection that is often raised against multiverse theories is that na¨ıvely
they can ‘explain’ anything and predict nothing, so that they cannot be tested and
considered scientific. The idea is that if a multiverse gives all possible physical pa-
rameters or other conditions somewhere within the multiverse, then the parameters
and conditions we observe will exist somewhere. Hence what we observe is ‘ex-
plained’ at least somewhere. On the other hand, if every possibility exists, then we
cannot predict any non-trivial restriction on what might be observed. If a theory
makes no non-trivial predictions, then it cannot be tested against observations, and
it can hardly be considered scientific.
2 Testable multiverse explanations
Sufficiently sophisticated multiverse theories can provide predictions as well as ex-
planations, and hence can be tested against observations scientifically. Unlike single-
universe theories, in each of which one can in principle predict uniquely the physical
parameters, in multiverse theories one usually can make only statistical predictions
for ranges of parameters, but this can still be much better than making no prediction
at all. However, to make such statistical predictions, the multiverse theory needs to
include a measure for the different observations that can be made. If it allows all
possible observations without putting any measure on them, then one can make no
predictions.
Since we have strong evidence that we live in a quantum universe, it would be
natural to seek a quantum multiverse theory. If this just includes some quantum
states, unitary evolution, path integrals, operators, some operator algebra and the
like, one has the bare quantum theory eloquently described by Sidney Coleman [12],
which by itself does not give any measures or probabilities. The Copenhagen version
of quantum theory does give these, but at the apparent cost of the collapses of the
wave-function at times undetermined by the theory and to states that are random.
Here I shall take essentially an Everett ‘many-worlds’ view that in actuality there
is no collapse of the wavefunction. However, to get testability of the quantum theory,
I shall assume that there is one aspect of the Copenhagen version that should be
added to the bare quantum theory: measures for observations that are expectation
values of certain corresponding ‘awareness operators’.
In Copenhagen theory, these operators are projection operators, and the mea-
sures are the probabilities for the results of the collapse of the wave-function. Here
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I shall not necessarily require the operators to be projection operators, though – to
give the positivity properties of measures – I shall assume they are at least positive
operators. Also, I shall not assume that anything really random occurs, such as
wave-function collapse, but that there are simply measures for all the different ob-
servations that might occur. In testing the theory against one’s observation, one can
regard that observation as being selected at random (with the theory-given measure)
from the set of all possible observations, but ontologically one can assume that all
possible observations with non-zero measure really do occur, so that there is never
a real physical random choice between them.
For the quantum theory to be fundamental, one would need to specify which
observations have measures and what the corresponding operators are whose expec-
tation values give those measures. In my opinion, the most fundamental aspect of a
true observation is a conscious perception or awareness of the observation. Therefore,
I have developed the framework of “Sensible Quantum Mechanics” (SQM) [13] or
“Mindless Sensationalism” [14] for giving the measures for sets of conscious percep-
tions as expectation values of corresponding positive operators that I call “awareness
operators”. This is only a framework (analogous to the bare quantum theory with-
out the detailed form of the unitary evolution or operator algebra), rather than a
detailed theory, since I have no detailed proposal for the sets of possible conscious
perceptions or for the corresponding positive operators. Presumably, for human
conscious perceptions, these operators are related to states of human brains, so un-
derstanding them better would involve brain physics. However, I do not see how
they could be deduced purely from an external examination of a brain, since we
cannot then know what is being consciously experienced by the brain.
To avoid the complications of brain physics, one might use the observed corre-
lation between external stimuli and conscious experiences to replace the unknown
awareness operators acting on brain-states with surrogate operators acting on the
correlated external stimuli. Of course, this would not work well for illusory or hal-
lucinatory conscious perceptions, for which the fundamental awareness operators
would presumably still work if they were known. However, one might prefer to
focus on conscious perceptions that are correlated with external stimuli and hence
better fit what is usually meant by observations.
If the awareness operator for a conscious perception is correlated with a single set
of external stimuli at a single time, it could be approximately replaced with a single
projection operator onto some external system. Alternatively, if it is correlated with
a sequence of measurement processes, then it could be approximately replaced with
a product of projection operators or a sum of such products, a class operator of the
decoherent histories approach to quantum theory [15, 16, 17].
Therefore, though I would not regard either the projection operators of Copen-
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hagen quantum theory or the class operators of decoherent histories quantum theory
as truly fundamental in the same way that I believe awareness operators are, it might
be true that in certain circumstances these are reasonable approximations to the fun-
damental awareness operators. Then one can take their expectation values in the
quantum state of the universe as giving the measure for the corresponding conscious
perception.
One example of this replacement would be to calculate the measure for conscious
perceptions of a certain value of the Hubble constant. In principle, in SQM this
would be the expectation value of a certain awareness operator that presumably
acts on suitable brain-states in which the observer is consciously aware of that
particular Hubble constant value. But the expectation value of this operator might
also be well approximated by that of some suitable operator acting on the logarithm
of the expansion rate of the part of the universe that is observed. Because the latter
operator does not involve brain physics, it might be easier to study scientifically and
so could be used as a good surrogate for the actual awareness operator.
However, it would presumably not be a good approximation to use the latter
operator if its expectation value depended significantly on parts of the universe where
there are no conscious observers: if one wants to use it to mimic the expectation
value for the perceptions of conscious observations, one must include a selection
effect which restricts to parts of the universe where there are conscious observers.
To include this selection effect in operators that are external to brains (or what-
ever directly has the conscious perceptions), so that their expectation values can be
good approximations for that of the fundamental awareness operators, is a difficult
task, since we do not know the physical requirements for conscious observers. For
example, there is nothing within our current understanding of physics that would tell
us whether or not some powerful computer is conscious, unless one makes assump-
tions about what is necessary for consciousness. Also, I know of nothing within our
current understanding of physics that would enable us to predict that I am currently
conscious of some of my visual sensations but not of my heartbeat, since presumably
information about both is being processed by my brain and would be incorporated
in a purely physical analysis.
Nevertheless, to get some very crude guess for a selection effect for conscious
observers, one might make the untested hypothesis that typical observers are like
us in requiring suitable complex chemical reactions and perhaps a liquid compound
like water. Then one could use the existence of liquid water as a very crude selection
effect for observers and attach it onto other projection or class operators used to
approximate some conscious perception depending on the external stimuli that are
described by the projection or class operators.
Thus one might use projection or class operators to ask the following two ques-
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tions: Does liquid water exist in part of the universe? Is that part of the universe
expanding at a suitable logarithmic rate? If the answer to these questions is yes with
some measure, then one might expect that there would be a roughly correspond-
ing expectation value for the awareness operator for conscious perceptions of that
value of the Hubble constant. This is an extremely crude approximation to what I
postulate would objectively exist as the expectation value of the true corresponding
awareness operator, but since these awareness operators are as yet largely unknown,
the crude approximation may be useful during our present ignorance.
One problem with calculating the measure for sets of conscious perceptions as
expectation values of corresponding ‘awareness operators’ is that na¨ıvely one might
get infinite values. By itself this would not necessarily be a problem, since only ratios
of measures are testable as conditional probabilities. However, when the measures
themselves are infinite, it is usually ambiguous how to take their ratios.
The problem arises if the awareness operators are sums of positive operators
that are each localized within finite spacetime regions (as one would expect if the
operators correspond to finite conscious beings). Assume that one such operator
in the sum has support within one of N spacetime regions of equal volume within
the total spacetime. Then by translational or diffeomorphism invariance, one would
expect the sum of the operators for a particular awareness operator to include a sum
over the corresponding operators in each of the N regions. (There would also be a
sum over operators that overlap different regions, but we need not consider those for
this argument.) This is essentially just the assumption that, if a suitable brain-state
for some conscious perception can occur in one of the N spacetime regions, then it
can also occur (depending on the quantum state) in any of the other N − 1 regions.
Also where it occurs in some coordinate system should not affect the content of the
conscious perception produced by the corresponding brain-state.
If the conditions for observers with the corresponding conscious perception occur
within all N spacetime regions, so that the expectation value of the operator within
each region has a positive expectation value bounded from below by a positive
number ǫ, then the total awareness operator (a sum of at least the individual positive
operators within each of the N regions) will have an expectation value at least as
large as Nǫ. This is infinite if the number N of such spacetime regions is infinite.
Essentially the argument is that, if the measure for a conscious perception has a
strictly positive expectation value for each spacetime volume in some region, then
for an infinite volume of spacetime where this is true the measure will be infinite.
One can regard this as arising from the infinite number of conscious observers that
arise in an infinite volume of spacetime with conditions suitable for life and conscious
observers.
Since inflation tends to produce a universe that is arbitrarily large (with an
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infinitely large expectation value for the spatial volume at any fixed time after
inflation and hence presumably infinitely many conscious observers), it tends to
produce an infinite measure for almost all non-zero sets of conscious observations.
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature [18, 19, 20, 21] of how to get well-
defined ratios of these infinite measures (or of related quantities, since the discussion
is not usually in terms of measures for conscious perceptions) but I think it is fair
to say that there is as yet no universally-accepted solution.
This is a serious problem that needs to be solved before we can hope to make
rigorous testable predictions for an inflationary multiverse. A vague hope is that
somehow the dimensionality of the part of the Hilbert space (or quantum state space
if it is bigger than the Hilbert space) where conscious observers are supported is fi-
nite, so that – for all finite quantum states – the expectation values of all finite
positive operators (including the awareness operators) would be finite, thus giving
finite measures for all conscious perceptions. But what would limit conscious ob-
servers to a finite dimensional part of the presumably infinite-dimensional quantum
state space eludes me.
3 Testing multi-observation theories with
typicality
If we can find a theory that gives finite measures for sets of observations (perhaps
conscious perceptions) or which can be approximated as the expectation values
of other positive operators, how can we test it? If the theory predicts a unique
observation (at least unique under some condition, such as observing a clock reading
to have some value), then one can simply check whether one’s observation fits the
prediction. This would typically be the case in a classical model of the universe with
a single observer who reads a clock that gives monotonically increasing readings (so
that there is only a single observation for each clock reading).
Although a classical solipsist might believe this is true for his universe, for most of
us the evidence is compelling that there are many observers and hence presumably
many different observations even at one value of some classical time. Quantum
theory further suggests that there are many possible observations – even for a single
observer at a single time.
There is a debate as to whether the observations given by quantum theory are
actual or are merely unrealized possibilities. The Copenhagen view seems to imply
that – for each value of the time and for each observer – there is only one observa-
tion that is actualized (say by collapse of the wave-function), so that all the other
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possibilities are unrealized. This seems to come from a na¨ıvely WYSIWYG1 view
of the universe, so to me it is much simpler to suppose that all possible observa-
tions predicted by the quantum theory are actualized, with no ugly collapse of the
wave-function to give a single actualized observation for each observer at each time.
We are already used to the idea of many different times (which are effectively just
different branches of the quantum state, at least in the Wheeler-DeWitt approach
to quantum gravity) and – except for solipsists – to the idea of many different ob-
servers, so why should we not accept the simple prediction from quantum theory of
many observations at the same time by the same observer?
In any case, whether in a classical universe or a quantum universe without col-
lapse of the wave-function, each time an observation occurs, there are many obser-
vations even at the same time and so one needs to be able to test this. To do this
for a theory that gives measures for all sets of observations, I would propose using
the concept of “typicality” [13], which is a suitable likelihood that one may use to
test or compare theories or to calculate their posterior probabilities in a Bayesian
analysis after assigning their prior probabilities.
The basic idea is to choose a set of possible observations that each give a single
real parameter, such as the Hubble constant or the value of one of the constants of
nature. Then we use the measure for sets of observations to get the measure for all
ranges of this single real parameter. For simplicity, we normalize the total measure
in the set of observations being considered to be unity.
Now we want to test one’s observation against the theory by calculating the typ-
icality for that observation within the set. For simplicity, I shall call the observation
being tested the ‘actual’ observation, even though the theory would say that all pos-
sible observations with non-zero measure are realized as actual observations. To do
this, one calculates the total ‘left’ and ‘right’ measures for all possible observations
in the set under consideration, i.e. the total measure to the left or right of and
including the ‘actual’ observation when they are ordered on the x-axis by the value
of the real parameter under consideration. These two measures will add up to 1 plus
the measure of the ‘actual’ observation, which is counted in both of the measures.
Next take the smaller of these two measures (the total measure on the more
extreme side if the ‘actual’ observation is not in the middle of the total measure)
as the ‘extreme’ measure of the ‘actual’ observation. We then use the normalized
measure of the set of observations to calculate the probability that a random obser-
vation within the set would give an ‘extreme’ measure as small as that of the ‘actual’
observation. This probability is what I call the ‘typicality’ of the actual observation
of the real parameter within the chosen set of possible observations. The typicality
is thus the probability that a random observation in the set is at least as extreme
1What You See Is What You Get (If you needed this footnote, WYSIWYG is not WYSIWYG.)
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as the actual observation. It depends not only on the actual observation but also
on the theory predicting the measure for the sets of observations. This is what is
needed to calculate the conditional probability of subsets of observations within the
set under consideration.
In the case in which the real parameter takes a continuum of values and there
is zero measure for an observation to have precisely any particular value, the left
plus right measures add up to unity. Then the extreme measure (the smaller of
the left and right measures) will will take continuous values from 0 to 1/2 with
a uniform probability distribution, so the typicality is twice the extreme measure.
In this simple case, the typicality is a random variable with a uniform probability
distribution ranging from 0 (if the actual parameter is at the extreme left or right)
to 1 (if the actual value is in the middle of its measure-weighted range, with both
left and right measures being 1/2).
If the real parameter takes on discrete values, then the situation is more com-
plicated. For example, suppose that the real parameter is k, with possible val-
ues k = −1 (with measure 0.2), k = 0 (with measure 0.35) and k = +1 (with
measure 0.45). Then k = −1 has a left measure of 0.2 and a right measure of
0.2 + 0.35 + 0.45 = 1 for an extreme measure of 0.2; k = 0 has a left measure of
0.2 + 0.35 = 0.55 and a right measure of 0.35 + 0.45 = 0.8 for an extreme measure
of 0.55; and k = +1 has a left measure of 0.2 + 0.35 + 0.45 = 1 and a right measure
of 0.45 for an extreme measure of 0.45. Thus the probability of an extreme measure
of 0.2 is 0.2 (the probability of k = −1); the probability of an extreme measure of
0.45 is 0.45 (the probability of k = +1); and the probability of an extreme measure
of 0.55 is 0.35 (the probability of k = 0). The typicality of k = −1 is the probability
that the extreme measure will be at least as small as 0.2, which is 0.2; the typicality
of k = 0 is the probability that the extreme measure will be at least as small as 0.55,
which is 0.2 + 0.45 + 0.35 = 1, and the typicality of k = +1 is the probability that
the extreme measure will be at least as small as 0.45, which is 0.2 + 0.45 = 0.65.
Note that only for the most extreme parameter value or values (for which the
extreme measure is the smallest possible within the set) is the typicality the same as
the normalized measure of the observation giving that value itself. For less extreme
parameter values, the typicality is greater than the measure of the observations
giving that parameter value. On the other hand, the least extreme parameter value
or values (the middle one, for which the ‘extreme’ measure is the greatest possible
within the set) has a typicality of unity. Thus the typicality always attains its
upper limit of unity for some member of the set, but the lowest value it attains is
the measure of the most extreme observation (which would be zero if the observed
parameter formed a continuum with zero measure for any particular value of the
parameter).
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The typicality is thus a likelihood, given a theory for the measures of sets of
values of a real parameter, for a parameter chosen randomly with the probability
measure given by the theory, to be at least as extreme as the ‘actual’ observed
parameter. The typicality has the advantage over the probability measure for the
actual observed parameter of being a probability that has values up to unity for some
possible observation. This differs from the probability measure for the parameter
itself, which may have a very small upper limit (e.g. if there is an enormous number
of possible discrete values for the parameter) or even a zero upper limit (e.g. if the
parameter ranges over a continuum and has a smooth probability density, with no
delta functions at any particular values of the parameters).
If one uses the probability measure itself as a likelihood, one cannot directly do
a Bayesian analysis with an observation of a continuous parameter having a smooth
probability density, since the resulting likelihood will be zero for all possible observed
values of the parameter. One might try to use the probability density instead of the
probability itself, but this depends on the coordinatization of the parameter and so
gives ambiguous results. For example, one would get a different likelihood for an
observed value of the Hubble constant H by using its probability density than one
would for H2.
Another approach that is often used for results that have a large number of
possible values is to bin them and then use the total probability for the bin in which
the actual observation lies as the likelihood. But again this depends on the bins and
so gives ambiguous results. The ambiguity of both the probability density and the
binning are avoided if one uses the typicality as I have defined it here.
Admittedly, if there are N > 1 parameters being observed, then there are am-
biguities even with the typicalities. First, with more than one parameter, one gets
more than one typicality. Second, if there are N independent parameters, one can
construct N independent combinations of them in arbitrarily many different ways.
Both of these problems are related to the issue of how one chooses to test a theory,
which has no unique answer.
Once one has made a choice of what set of observations to include and what
parameter to determine the typicality for, how do we use the typicality to test a
theory? It can be used – like any other likelihood – in the following manner: Let Hn
be an hypothesis that gives measures to observations in the set, so that an actual
observation O has typicality Tn(O) according to this hypothesis. At the simplest
level, one can say that, if Tn(O) is low, then Hn is ruled out at the corresponding
level. For example, if Tn(O) < 0.01, then one can say that Hn is ruled out at the
99% confidence level.
A better approach would be to assign initial or prior probabilities Pi(Hn) to
different hypotheses Hn, labeled by different values of n. Then the typicalities
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Tn(O) for these different hypotheses would be used as weights to adjust the Pi(Hn)
to final or posterior probabilities Pf (Hn) that are given by Bayes’ formula:
Pf(Hn) =
Tn(O)Pi(Hn)∑
m Tm(O)Pi(Hm)
. (1)
Apart from the ambiguity of choosing the set of possible observations and the pa-
rameter to be observed and the physics problem of calculating the typicalities Tm(O)
assigned by each theory Hm, there is now the new ambiguity of assigning prior prob-
abilities Pi(Hm) to the theories themselves. This appears to be a purely subjective
matter, though – in the spirit of Ockham’s razor – scientists would generally assign
higher prior probabilities to simpler theories. Of course, there are arbitrarily many
ways to do that. However, if one just considered an infinite countable set of theories
that one could order in increasing order of complexity, from the simplest H1 to the
next simplest H2 and so on, then one simple assignment of prior probabilities would
be
Pi(Hm) = 2
−m . (2)
The idea of restricting attention to a countable set of theories seems plausible,
since humans could really consider only a finite set of theories, but it could be
inappropriate if the ultimate theory of the universe contained an infinite amount of
information, even if merely in the form of a single real coupling constant or some
other parameter whose digits are not compressible (i.e. generated by a finite amount
of input information). Note that it is considered to be a merit of string/M theory
that there is not even the possibility of having infinite amounts of information in any
dimensionless coupling constants, at least in the dynamical equations of the theory,
although it is apparently not yet ruled out that the quantum state might have an
infinite amount of information. This might apply to the expectation value of the
dilaton, although most theorists would also prefer to avoid this possibility.
4 Testing the single-universe and multiverse
hypotheses
Tegmark [22] has classified multiverse hypotheses into Levels 1, 2, 3 and 4. Level
1 is regions beyond our cosmic horizon, with the same ‘constants of nature’ as our
own region. Level 2 is other post-inflation bubbles, perhaps with different ‘con-
stants of nature’. Level 3 are the Everett many worlds of quantum theory, with the
same features as Level 2. Level 4 is other mathematical structures, with different
fundamental equations of physics as well as different constants of nature.
Levels 1-3 can all come from a single universe if we define a universe to be some
quantum state in some quantum state space (e.g. some C*-algebra state). In this
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case, the quantum state-space may be regarded as a set of quantum operators and
their algebra, and the quantum state as an assignment of an expectation value to
each quantum operator. To get measures for observations in the form of conscious
perceptions, one must add to this bare quantum theory an assignment of a particular
positive operator for each set of conscious perceptions. The resulting ‘awareness
operators’ then form a positive-operator-valued set obeying the appropriate sum
rules when one forms unions of disjoint sets of conscious perceptions, so that the
resulting expectation values have the properties of a measure on sets of conscious
perceptions [13, 14].
Different hypotheses Hm that each specify a single SQM universe would give dif-
ferent quantum state spaces, different operator algebras, different quantum states,
different sets of conscious perceptions and/or different sets of awareness operators
corresponding to the sets of conscious perceptions. (A quantum state is here de-
fined, in the C*-algebra sense, as the quantum expectation values for all possible
quantum operators in the set.) By the SQM rule that the measure for each set of
conscious perceptions is the expectation value given by the quantum state for the
corresponding awareness operator, a definite SQM theory Hn would give a definite
measure for each set of possible conscious perceptions. This would be a theory of
a single SQM universe, though that universe could be a multiverse in the senses of
Levels 1-3.
Then by the procedure outlined above, from one’s actual observation O, a suf-
ficient intelligence should be able to calculate for each Hm the typicality Tm(O) of
that observation. If one has a set of such theories with prior probabilities Pi(Hm),
then one can use a Bayesian analysis to calculate the posterior probability Pf(Hn)
for any specific theory Hn and thereby test the theory at a statistical or probabilistic
level.
But what if there is more than one universe? Tegmark [22, 23] has raised the pos-
sibility of a multiverse containing different mathematical structures, and it certainly
seems logically conceivable that reality may consist of more than one universe in the
sense of Levels 1 to 3. Tegmark discusses a Level 4 multiverse which, as he describes
it, includes all mathematical structures. This seems to me logically inconsistent and
inconceivable. My argument against Level 4 is that different mathematical struc-
tures can be contradictory, and contradictory ones cannot co-exist. For example,
one structure could assert that spacetime exists somewhere and another that it does
not exist at all. However, these two structures cannot both describe reality.
Now one could say that different mathematical structures describe different ex-
isting universes, so that they each apply to separate parts of reality and cannot be
contradictory. But this set of existing universes, and the different mathematical
structures with their indexed statements about each of them, then forms a bigger
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mathematical structure. At the ultimate level, there can be only one world and, if
mathematical structures are broad enough to include all possible worlds or at least
our own, there must be one unique mathematical structure that describes ultimate
reality. So I think it is logical nonsense to talk of Level 4 in the sense of the co-
existence of all mathematical structures. However, one might want to consider how
to test levels of the multiverse between Levels 1-3 and 4.
One way to extend an SQM universe to a multiverse might be to allow more than
one quantum state on the same quantum state-space, while keeping the other parts
of the structure – such as the awareness operators – the same. Then if a weight is
assigned to each of these different quantum states, one can get the measure for each
set of conscious perceptions as the weighted sum of the measures for each quantum
state. But this is equivalent to defining a new single quantum state in a new single-
universe theory that is the weighted sum of these different quantum states in the
original description. That is, the new single quantum state would be defined to
give as the expectation value of each operator the weighted sum of the expectation
values that the different quantum states would give. (If the quantum state can be
described by a density matrix, then the new density matrix would be the weighted
sum of the old ones.)
Since the measure for a set of conscious perceptions in an SQM universe is the
expectation value given by the quantum state of the awareness operator correspond-
ing to the set of conscious perceptions, one would get the same measure by using
the new quantum state as by taking the weighted sum of the measures in the old
description in which there are different quantum states.
Another way to get a broader multiverse would be to keep the same quantum
state-space, quantum operators, operator algebra and set of possible conscious per-
ceptions, but to include different sets of awareness operators in different SQM uni-
verses. But again, if one weights the resulting measures for each universe to get
a total measure for this multiverse, this would be equivalent to forming a single
new set of awareness operators that are each the weighted sum of the corresponding
awareness operators in each of the different universes.
Yet another way to extend the multiverse would be to include universes with
separate quantum state-spaces, each with its own quantum state and awareness
operators. If each of these universes has a weight, then one can again get the total
measure for each set of conscious perception by taking the weighted sum of the
measure for that set in each universe. This would be equivalent to defining a total
quantum state-space whose quantum operators were generated by the tensor sum of
the operators in each of the original sets of operators that correspond to the original
separate quantum state-spaces. One could take operators from different original sets
as commuting to define the quantum algebra of the new set.
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The new single quantum state could then be defined by giving – on any sum
of operators from the separate sets of operators – the weighted sum of expectation
values that the old quantum states gave. For products of operators from different
sets, one could just take the new expectation value to be the product of the weighted
old expectation values for the separate operators in each set. The new awareness
operators could be defined as the sum of the original awareness operators. Since this
would involve only sums from the different sets of operators and not products, the
expectation values of the new awareness operators would all be linear in the weights
for the original separate universes in the new single quantum state and hence would
give in that new single quantum state the same measure as the weighted sum of the
original measures.
Each of these three simple-minded ways to attempt to extend the multiverse
produces nothing new, at least for the measures of sets of conscious perceptions.
Thus a single SQM universe is a fairly broad concept, encompassing a wide vari-
ety of ways of generating measures for conscious perceptions. In fact, one could
argue that any assignment of measures for conscious perceptions could come from a
single SQM universe, since one could just define awareness operators for all sets of
conscious perceptions and embed these into a larger set of quantum operators with
some algebra. One could then just choose the quantum state to give the desired
expectation values for all of the awareness operators.
In principle, one could even choose the algebra of operators to be entirely com-
muting, so that the resulting quantum theory would be entirely classical, though still
possibly giving the Everett many worlds rather than just a single classical world.
Thus even a universe that gives exactly the same measures for conscious percep-
tions as ours, and hence the same typicalities for all observations, could in principle
be entirely classical in the sense of being commutative. We cannot prove that the
universe is quantum just from our observations.
However, surely such a classical description of our conscious perceptions would in-
volve a more complicated SQM universe than one in which there are non-commuting
operators (and presumably even non-commuting awareness operators). Thus it is
on the ground of simplicity and Ockham’s razor that we assign higher probabilities
to non-commuting quantum theories that explain our observations, even though the
likelihoods for our observations can be precisely the same in a classical theory. In a
similar way it might turn out that, although a multiple-SQM-universe theory could
be reduced to a single-SQM-universe theory in one of the ways outlined above, the
description could be simpler in terms of the former or even in terms of universes
that are not SQM.
If we do have a true multiverse of different universes, each of which gives a
measure for each set of conscious perceptions, then to get a measure covering the
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whole of reality, we would need a measure for each of the individual multiverses.
For suppose each universe is described by an hypothesis Hn that assigns a measure
µn(S) for each set S of conscious perceptions. When we were considering single
universes, we considered different Hm just as theoretical alternative possibilities
and discussed assigning subjective prior probabilities Pi(Hm) to them. But when
we are considering true multiverses, we need an objective weight w(Hn) for each
universe, since each universe with non-zero weight is being considered to actually
exist. Therefore the total measure for each set of conscious perceptions from this
extended multiverse would be µ(S) =
∑
n w(Hn)µn(S).
Extending the multiverse to multiple SQM universes (or to any ensemble in
which there is a prediction for the measure for all sets of conscious perceptions
from each universe) replaces our uncertainty about which Hn is correct with the
uncertainty about which w(Hn) is correct. It would replace Tegmark’s question [22]
“Why these equations?” with “Why this measure?” We cannot evade some form of
this question by invoking ever higher levels of the multiverse, even though this may
provide a simpler description of a world.
In the sense that an SQM universe is a single universe, it may still encompass
Level 1-3 multiverses. At the true multiverse level, we need not just a single theory
Hn for a single universe but also a meta-theory I for the measure or weight w(Hn)
of the single universes within the set of actually existing multiverses. However, since
we do not yet know what the correct meta-theory is, just as we do not yet know what
the correct theory Hn is for our single universe, we may wish to consider various
theoretically possible meta-theories, IM , labeled by some index M in the same way
that n labeled the single universe described by the theory Hn. Then meta-theory
IM says that single universes exist with measures wM,n ≡ wM(Hn) and so a set of
conscious perceptions S would have measure µM(S) =
∑
n wM,nµn(S). From the
measure for conscious perceptions, one can follow the procedure outlined in the
previous section to get the typicality TM(O) of an observation O in meta-theory IM .
For example, if the single universes described by Hn are labeled by the positive
integers n in order of increasing complexity, and if the meta-theories IM are labeled
by the positive integers M , one might imagine the following choice for the weights
wM,n of the meta-theory IM to give the universe Hn:
w2m−1,n =
1
m
(
m
m+ 1
)n
, w2m,n = δmn . (3)
Then for oddM , one gets a geometric distribution of weights over all single universes
described by the theories Hn, with the mean of n being m+1. However, for evenM ,
one gets a non-zero (unit) weight only for the unique single universe described by
the theory Hm. Thus the odd members of this countable sequence of meta-theories
do indeed give multiverse theories with various weights, but the even members give
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single-universe theories.
Just as in a Bayesian analysis for single-universe theories we needed subjective
prior probabilities Pi(Hm) for the possible single-universe theories Hm, so now for a
Bayesian analysis of multiverse meta-theories IM , we need subjective prior probabili-
ties Pi(IM). Again, although these subjective prior probabilities are really arbitrary,
we may wish to invoke Ockham’s razor for the meta-theories and assign the simpler
ones the greater prior probabilities. For example, if we can re-order the IM in in-
creasing order of complexity by another natural number N(M), one might use the
simple subjective prior probability assignment
Pi(IM) = 2
−N(M) . (4)
This would imply that the simplest meta-theory (N = 1) is assigned 50% prior
probability of being correct, the next simplest (N = 2) 25% etc.
For a more ad hoc choice, one could take the meta-theory weights given by the
hybrid model of eqn (3) for both single and multiple universes and arbitrarily set
Pi(I2m−1) = Pi(I2m) = 2
−m−1 . (5)
This gives a total prior probability of 1/2 for single-universe (even M) theories and
1/2 for multiple-universe (odd M) theories. This might be viewed as a compromise
assignment if one is a priori ambivalent about whether a single-universe or multiple-
universe theory should be used.
5 Conclusions
Even though multiverse theories usually involve unobservable elements, they may
give testable predictions for observable elements if they include a well-defined mea-
sure for observations. One can then analyze them by Bayesian means, using the
theory-dependent typicality of the result of observations as a likelihood for the the-
ory, though there is still an inherent ambiguity in assigning prior probabilities to
the theories.
One can try to avoid specifying the equations or other properties of an individ-
ual universe by assuming that there is an ensemble of different universes, but this
replaces the question of the equations with the question of the measure for the differ-
ent universes in the ensemble. There is no apparent way to avoid having non-trivial
content to a testable theory fully describing all of reality.
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